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chapter 4

Spinoza’s rejection of Maimonideanism
Steven Frankel

According to the prevailing view among contemporary scholars,
Maimonides and Spinoza share so much in common that in order to
understand Spinoza, one must ﬁrst recognize his debt to Maimonides.
Spinoza’s profound kinship with Maimonides is revealed by his adoption
of the terms of medieval theology (form, essence, mode, attribute, substance, etc.), and also its goals (amor Dei intellectualis).1 Spinoza, according
to this view, simply carried the arguments of Maimonides to their logical
conclusions.2 At ﬁrst glance, this is surprising since Maimonides presents
himself as a defender of revelation, while Spinoza launches a devastating
critique of Scripture and its defenders, particularly Maimonides. But
according to contemporary scholars, such diﬀerences can be explained as
the result of political accommodations to their respective audiences.3 Thus,
Zev Harvey argues that Spinoza “was a Maimonidean in the sense that
fundamental elements of Maimonides’ philosophy recur as fundamental
elements of his philosophy.”4 Their kinship is obscured because
Maimonides addresses a Jewish audience while Spinoza addresses a
I wish to thanks Timothy Sean Quinn and Marc Cohen for their helpful comments and criticisms.
1
For more on Spinoza’s debt to the Jewish tradition, see Nadler 1999, 114ﬀ.
2
The attempt to assimilate the views of Maimonides with those of Spinoza generally takes the form of
the claim that “Spinoza’s position is a logical outcome of Maimonides or that Maimonides at least
leaves the door open for Spinoza” (Batniksky 2003–2004, 517). Steven Nadler suggests that Spinoza’s
denial of personal immortality is “simply the logical culmination” of Maimonides’ view of the soul
(Nadler 2001, 95, 130).
3
“Made of sterner stuﬀ and living a few centuries later, Spinoza would have perhaps demanded the
overthrow of the old order with its eﬀete institutions so as to build upon its ruins a new society . . . But
being what he was and living at a time when belief in the potency of reformation had not yet been
shaken by doubt, he chose to follow in the footsteps of rationalizers throughout history. The story of
this rationalization is the story of his TTP” (see Wolfson 1934, 333). Wolfson asserts that Spinoza’s
“reputed God-intoxication was really nothing but a hang-over of an earlier religious jag” (348). Richard
McKeon treats Spinoza as the last of the scholastics (McKeon 1928).
4
See Harvey 1981, 172. Similarly, Shlomo Pines asserts that Spinoza “does Maimonides the honour,
rarely or never vouchsafed to him in modern times, to disprove him . . . [H]e is able to do this because
he is prepared to adopt some of the presuppositions of Maimonides. He also pays [Maimonides] the,
in a sense, greater compliment of adapting some of his ideas” (Pines 1968, 3).
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Christian one. David Biale oﬀers an interesting variation on this theme. He
argues that Spinoza generally follows Maimonides though he is not
concerned with the juridical deﬁciencies of the rabbinic tradition; nonetheless, Spinoza – whom Biale refers to as “Maimonides’ stepson” – built his
rational faith on Maimonidean foundations.5 Spinoza thought he was
breaking radically from the Jewish tradition. In hindsight, we can see
what Spinoza could not, namely that his “arguments are squarely in the
Maimonidean tradition.”6
But there is also reason to be skeptical of such claims. For one thing,
Spinoza may have had his own reasons for overstating his kinship with
Maimonides. He may have wished, for example, to adopt the appearance of
a pious heir to the medieval tradition to distract readers from the overall
eﬀect of his analysis, which is to undermine revelation. As Martin Yaﬀe
suggests, Spinoza puts “new wine in old bottles that still bear their original
labels along with traces of the original contents.”7 Hobbes too was struck by
the boldness of Spinoza’s critique of religion rather than his debt to
medieval philosophy or Maimonides.8 According to Leo Strauss,
Spinoza’s appropriation of Maimonides to advance his own very diﬀerent
theological-political program was “amazingly unscrupulous” and ruthlessly
Machiavellian.9 Along these same lines, Joshua Parens argues, as the title of
his book Maimonides and Spinoza: Their Conﬂicting Views of Human Nature
suggests, that the “main value to be derived from studying Maimonides is to
gain distance from our own world and viewpoint, which has been so deeply
shaped by the thought of Spinoza.”10
The goal of this chapter is to show that the causes of this scholarly
disagreement and the diﬃculty in assessing the relation between Spinoza
and Maimonides reﬂect Spinoza’s own contradictory treatment of
Maimonides. In Chapter 5 of the TTP he criticizes Maimonides for giving
too much authority to the Bible at the expense of reason; in Chapter 7, he
criticizes Maimonides for giving too much authority to reason. The contradiction is exacerbated by the fact that Spinoza seems guilty of espousing the
very position that he criticizes: he appears to give too much authority to the
Bible when he oﬀers a set of theological dogmas and insists that all decent
men (honestos) submit to them.11 On the other hand, he insists in his
5
8
9
10

6
7
Biale 2011, 29.
Ibid., 25.
Spinoza 2004, 253.
For a discussion of Aubrey’s famous account of Hobbes and his reaction to the TTP, see Curley
1992.
See Strauss 1968, 244: “Spinoza’s critique is directed against the whole body of authoritative teachings
and rules known in Spinoza’s time as Judaism” (253).
See Parens 2012, 1. 11 TTP 14, Spinoza 1925, III.177; 2004, 164.
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critique of miracles (in Chapter 6) that the Bible’s teaching reﬂects a
profound ignorance of nature and can be safely put aside. As we shall see,
Spinoza adopts a novel view of the relation between reason and revelation
that explains this contradiction and exposes his estrangement from
Maimonides.

Spinoza’s critique(s) of Maimonides
Spinoza examines Maimonides’ position at length, quoting him twice in the
TTP in Chapters 5 and 7. The ﬁrst quote comes from Maimonides’ popular
text, the Mishneh Torah (Hilkhot Melachim), to the eﬀect that the decision
to submit to the Noahide laws, and more generally to revelation, is valid
only on the grounds that they are commanded by God.12 A person who
accepts them because they are consistent with reason, according to
Maimonides,13 such a person is neither pious nor has a share in the world
to come. The laws of Noah resemble natural law inasmuch as they apply to
all mankind (“the children of Noah”). But unlike natural law, their force
comes from a covenant with God reported in Genesis 9, and not from
reason’s recognition of their truth. Even though reason and revelation point
to the same universal law, they arrive at this law in diﬀerent ways and this
diﬀerence is decisive: faith and salvation involve obedience to the divine
law; reason does not obey any law but consents only to what it understands.
(Spinoza presents a similar argument on behalf of the separation of reason
and revelation in Chapter 15 of the TTP.) As we shall see, when we turn to
the context of this critique, the substance of the disagreement virtually
disappears altogether.14
Spinoza prefaces his remarks on Maimonides with a sketch of his political
teaching: men need to live in communities for the sake of security and
comfort, and were they fully rational, they would recognize this necessity
and act in accordance with it. Unfortunately, “human nature is constituted
quite otherwise. All men do seek their own advantage, but hardly on the
basis of the dictates of sound reason.”15 The purpose of government, therefore, is to check men’s passions and compel them to behave peacefully.
12

13
14
15

It is important to keep in mind that Spinoza’s primary audience is not the Jewish community, but
rather the Protestant community as he encountered it in Holland. Maimonides can be read as a less
provocative stand-in for scriptural interpreters such as Ludwig Meyer; see Preus 2001, 37.
According to Joseph Caro, the passage expresses not only Maimonides’ personal opinion but also that
of the Jewish tradition; see Strauss 1968, 248–249.
Spinoza’s use of this passage infuriated the neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen, who wished to establish the
universalism of Jewish ethics. For a fuller discussion of Cohen’s position see ibid.
TTP 5, Spinoza 1925, III.73; 2004, 59.
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Spinoza also explains that the role of government is not to educate men and
make them more reasonable. Although the exertion of power by government
is necessary and even beneﬁcial, men resent such compulsion.16 This is the
case “least of all,” Spinoza writes, when they are “serving their equals and
being regulated by them.”17 Men do not resent all authority, for example, if
they are persuaded of the superiority of the sovereign. But for irrational men,
only miracle workers or prophets are capable of persuading the multitude of
their superiority.18 Short of such “demonstrations,” resentment will throw a
state into perpetual turmoil, with its subjects rooting for its downfall.
Spinoza introduces his own political theology to dramatize the problem
and suggest a solution. The Israelites did not resent the authority of Moses
because it was rooted in compelling claims about the divine and promises of
reward, which kept the Israelites in awe of Moses’ political power. Moses
astutely perceived the political backwardness of this nation – “a people
incapable of self-rule” – and prescribed a ﬁtting system of law which
eliminated all freedom of thought and choice. He crafted a law so that
every action and decision “admonished them to obedience always” and,
thanks to a ceremonial law, even their “own decree” would not be free.19
In contrast to the Mosaic regime, the Gospels teach that Christ frees all
nations from the Mosaic law in favor of another divine law, the hallmark of
which is the free or voluntary submission to its authority:
Paul concludes that, since God is the God of all nations, that is, is equally
propitious to all, and since all men equally live under the law and under sin,
therefore God sent his Christ to all nations, to free all men equally from the
slavery of the law, so that they might no longer act by the command of the
law, but by the steadfast decree of the spirit. Accordingly Paul teaches
precisely what we mean.20

The essence of a living faith is freedom, that is, the decision to obey the divine
law enumerated in Scripture according to one’s “free will.”21 While Judaism is
16
18

19

20
21

See Gilden 1973, 377–387. 17 TTP 5, Spinoza 1925, III.74; 2004, 59.
“Men in general judge more by their eyes than by their hands, because seeing is given to everyone,
touching to few. Everyone sees how you appear, few touch what you are; and these few dare not to
oppose the opinion of the many, who have the majesty of the state to defend them” (in Machiavelli
1998, 71). Spinoza’s emphasis on freedom throughout the TTP refers to political freedom, that is, the
ability to pursue one’s passions and desires and not action in accord with reason.
TTP 5, Spinoza 1925, III.76; 2004, 61. For a powerful response (and defense of Judaism), see Levinas
1990, 111–118. Levinas claims that Spinoza’s account of Judaism as an “inevitable stage on the road to
truth” encouraged Western Jewish intellectuals to view Judaism merely as a primitive stage in the
human search for truth. See also Cohen 1924, 290–372.
TTP 3, Spinoza 1925, III.54; 2004, 39. For more details on this theology of freedom, see Frankel 2002,
273–296.
TTP 5, Spinoza 1925, III.75, 76; 2004, 60, 61.
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characterized by constant obedience, a solution which is barely preferable to
slavery (and only because it commands obedience to a divine master),
Christianity is marked by its freedom from the law.22 Christians need not
obey any ceremonial law; its teachings are universal and manifest to the “natural
light of reason” rather than the revelation of a particular political or ceremonial
law.23 In short, Christianity is characterized by freedom and self-determination
which is expressed most clearly in the rational recognition of the truth.
The problem with rational freedom is that it is not available to the people
that it purports to save. Universal faith involves reasoning based on
empirical grounds, that is, “from what sense perception tells [us] occurs in
nature,” or “on the basis of self-evident intellectual axioms” and the careful
deductions from those axioms. Because most people do not have the
patience, care, or intelligence to deduce a long series of propositions from
self-evident axioms, this natural or rational basis of faith is largely irrelevant
to the political problem (that to live in communities, men need compulsion
yet resent and resist it). As Spinoza argues in the Political Treatise,
[T]he road which reason teaches us to follow is very steep, so that those who
believe that ordinary people or those who are busily engaged in public
business can be persuaded to live solely at reason’s behest are dreaming of
the golden age of the Poets or a myth.24

Spinoza suggests an alternative solution to the political problem.
Scripture presents a teaching regarding “philosophic matters” presented in
an easy-to-grasp historical narrative that requires no special training or
intellectual ability to understand.25 He concludes that although such
22

23
24

25

“God is the God of all nations, i.e. since He is equally propitious to all, and since all were equally
under the law and sin, [therefore] God sent to all nations His Christ, who would free all equally of
bondage to the law” (TTP 3, Spinoza 1925, III.54; 2004, 39). In contrast to Moses, the greatest of the
Hebrew prophets, Jesus was free of any defective knowledge of God: “If Moses spoke with God face
to face, as a man speaks with his friend (i.e., by means of their two bodies), Christ communicated with
God mind to mind” (TTP 1, Spinoza 1925, III.21; 2004, 7).
TTP 5, Spinoza 1925, III.76; 2004, 61.
See TP 1, Spinoza 1925, III.275; 2000, 35–36, also see Ethics Vp42s on the diﬃculty of following reason,
and Ethics Vp1–p10s on the ability of reason to moderate the passions. According to Ethics IVp4dem, a
human being cannot be fully self-caused and therefore he “is necessarily always subject to passions.”
“[T]he greatest authority to interpret Scripture . . . must not be so diﬃcult that it can be directed by
the most acute Philosophers, but must be accommodated to the natural and common mental cast and
capacity of men, as we have shown ours to be” (TTP 7, Spinoza 1925, III.117; 2004, 101). Mignini
argues that reason can never have very much control over the passions and therefore religion is always
necessary, even for rational men: “[T]he imagination is the instrument and impassable limit of
fortune; if it is founded upon the relation between the human body and other bodies, as the
representative structure of aﬀectiones, one can understand why Spinoza aﬃrmed that reason, considered as true knowledge, has no power of the imagination and can do nothing against the course of
fortune and the emotions which it produces” (Mignini 1984,130).
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narratives cannot provide knowledge of the truth, they can instill true
opinions, for example, they can “still teach and enlighten men as much is
suﬃcient for impressing obedience and devotion in their spirits.”26 Just
before his critique of Maimonides, and in keeping with his account of
Christianity as a faith characterized by freedom and rationality, Spinoza
ostensibly adopts the Maimonidean view on the relation of reason and
revelation. According to this view, Scripture presents the truths of reason in
an imaginative language accessible to non-philosophers so that their lives are
consistent with the teachings of reason. Of course, this does not fully cure
them of superstition; nonetheless, they can still enjoy some measure of
blessedness thanks to the compelling narratives of the Gospels.27
Thus, Spinoza’s criticism of Maimonides in Chapter 5 is hardly intended
as a rejection of the Maimonidean strategy of using the Bible to teach and
edify the multitude. Rather, Spinoza’s problem with Maimonides is limited
to a particular defect of his theology, namely that it provides insuﬃcient
warrant for a universal faith. Even here, Maimonides is not fully to blame
since he was forced to work within the conﬁnes of a highly particular
theology to develop a religion with universal scope. A Spinoza quote from
the Mishneh Torah conﬁrms this view:
Everyone who takes to heart the [Noahide laws] and diligently follows them,
belongs to the pious of nations and is heir to the world to come . . . [if] he
follows them because God has ordained them in his Law . . . But if he follows
them through the guidance of reason, he is not a dweller among the pious
nor among the wise of the nations.28

For Maimonides, the covenant with Noah represents Scripture’s universal
teaching, and such a covenant cannot be established on the basis of reason,
but only on obedience to revelation. Spinoza’s criticism here concerns
merely a theological diﬀerence with Maimonides: if Scripture has a universal teaching, it should not be conﬁned to a particular tradition but accessible
26

27

28

TTP 5, Spinoza 1925, III.77–78; 2004, 63. Spinoza candidly admits that faith “cannot give us the
knowledge and love of God . . . [but] is very useful with a view to civil life. For the more we have
observed and the better we know the character and circumstances of men . . . the better will we be able
to live more cautiously among them and accommodate our lives to their disposition as much as reason
suggests” (TTP 4, Spinoza 1925, III.62; 2004, 46). David Lachterman suggests that the TTP
retranslates a scientiﬁc concept of law back into the human domain so that the “pre-scientiﬁc
understanding of law, legislation, legislators, obedience and disobedience can all be intelligently
derived” (Lachterman 1991, 132).
Steven Smith argues that Spinoza’s positive presentation of Christianity “was dictated not by the
methods of historical philology but by the need to gain genuine support for his universal religion of
tolerance”: Smith 1997, 105.
TTP 5, Spinoza 1925, III.79–80; 2004, 64–65. I have added emphasis to the phrases which show the
universal breadth of Maimonides’ declaration.
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to everyone.29 Such access is possible only with a theology of freedom as is
found in the Gospels, a teaching rooted in reason as the only sure path to
blessedness. Despite this theological diﬀerence, Spinoza’s critique of
Maimonides reinforces their agreement on the irrationality of the multitude
and their need for guidance. Spinoza also concurs with Maimonides that
Scripture represents a practical solution to the problem of superstition, a
solution made possible by the fact that reason teaches the very freedom
celebrated in the Gospels. In Spinoza’s interpretation, the Gospels liberate
men from the Mosaic law and make possible a universal law.30
Given their overall agreement, it is surprising that when Spinoza returns
to Maimonides in Chapter 7, he describes the Maimonidean approach to
Scripture as “harmful, useless, and absurd.”31 His goal is nothing less than
the annihilation (Spinoza uses the conjugated verb explodimus) of the
Maimonidean method of interpretation. In contrast to his Maimonidean
treatment of the Gospels in Chapter 5, Spinoza now urges restraint in
explaining the meaning of Scripture and questions whether the text even
has a single consistent teaching or the ultimate truth. He insists that the
Bible be approached with the same caution as any ancient historical document, and in particular that we should not project foreign or imagined views
onto Scripture.32 One of the most egregious violations of this caution is
29

30

31
32

Scripture is one of many, and perhaps not the most important, sources for theology. Hence, Spinoza
asserts that “belief in historical narratives of any kind whatsoever has nothing to do with the Divine
Law”: TTP 5, Spinoza 1925, III.79; 2004, 64.
In order to appreciate the meaning of political freedom and how it leads to peace, we must distinguish it
from both slavery and true freedom. True freedom – “he alone is free who lives with a full spirit solely
on the basis of the guidance of reason” – is not politically relevant because such rationality is unavailable
to most men. Slavery, of course, is the opposite of freedom but, according to Spinoza, it is not simply a
matter of living in obedience to another’s command (TTP 16, Spinoza 1925, III.194; 2004, 184). Rather
the slave lives in obedience to commands that are not useful to himself. In contrast, the politically free
individual or subject obeys commands – and in this sense is not free – but since those commands are for
the beneﬁt of the subject, he obeys them willingly. This willful obedience is the hallmark of political
freedom. Obedience to law is freedom in a political sense because political authority depends in part on
my perception of a harmony between my interests and the interests of the community. Freedom,
particularly in a democracy, is the most stable and secure regime because it appears to accord most
closely with my perception of my own conatus as freedom of will. As Spinoza remarks: a liberal
democratic state “seems the most natural and to go along most with the freedom that nature grants to
each” (emphasis added; TTP 16, Spinoza 1925, III.195; 2004, 185). The seeming freedom of liberal
democracy is Spinoza’s political theology. As with his biblical theology, Spinoza leaves us free to
interpret it according to our capacity. Many individuals will undoubtedly see political freedom as the
highest type of freedom, sanctioned by nature. Others will recognize that such freedom is an illusion,
but is nonetheless the most eﬀective superstition for producing political security and stability.
TTP 7, Spinoza 1925, III.116; 2004, 100.
Spinoza reports that Jewish theologians commonly hold the view that Scripture has inﬁnitely many
profound meanings, that everything in Scripture from the ancient marks above the letters to the
contradictions within the narrative, is fraught with meaning (TTP 9, Spinoza 1925, III.140; 2004,
126). But if Scripture has inﬁnite meaning, the result can be only inﬁnite quarreling: “For if
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Maimonides’ claim that the prophets “were the most acute Philosophers”
who grasped the truth of things.33 After characterizing Christianity as
teaching freedom consistent with rationality in Chapter 5, it would appear
that Spinoza has violated his own rule and imposed a philosophical meaning
onto scripture.
To grasp the meaning of Spinoza’s critique of Maimonides in Chapter 7,
we must clarify its purpose. Spinoza certainly does not reject Maimonides’
views regarding the superiority of reason, or the rejection of religious and
pagan superstitions. Rather, the issue concerns the authority of reason among
the multitude. Spinoza insists that most men will not recognize the authority
of reason or defer to the wisdom of philosophers. Maimonides’ hermeneutic,
in Spinoza’s interpretation, attempts to establish covertly the authority of
reason in politics by installing a “new type of priest,” a philosopher who is
adept at portraying rational truths in imaginative language.34 To do this,
Maimonides slyly suggests that regardless of the literal meaning of Scripture,
there is a deeper, rational level to its teachings. The problem with this
hermeneutical strategy is that it undermines, and ultimately dislodges, the
literal sense of Scripture and thereby destroys “the certainty about the sense of
Scripture which the vulgar can have by a straightforward reading . . . ”35 As a
result, the meaning of Scripture is thrown open to superstitious speculation.
Maimonides’ superstitious followers concluded “that reason has to serve as
the handmaid of Scripture, and submit to it completely.”36
In contrast, Spinoza outlines an eﬀective hermeneutical method which is
accessible to the multitude.37 This method accepts the literal meaning of the

33
34

35
36

37

interpreting Scripture in their mode were permitted everywhere, there would surely be no speech
whose true sense we could not doubt” (TTP 10, Spinoza 1925, III.148; 2004, 135). Such a view serves
those polemical theologians who are interested in promoting superstitious speculations about the
meaning of Scripture. To be sure, Spinoza’s method opens up the same possibilities, but not for
superstitious speculations.
TTP 5, Spinoza 1925, III.117; 2004, 101.
In the Maimonidean solution, the wisdom for combining reason and revelation presumably moderates the political ambitions of the theologians and, at the same time, alleviates the resentment which
attends all communities. Spinoza rejects this not only because passionate individuals stubbornly resist
reason, but also because he doubts that reason can moderate either the political ambitions or
superstitious tendencies of priests. See Frankel 1999, 897–924.
TTP 7, Spinoza 1925, III.116; 2004, 100.
TTP 15, Spinoza 1925, III.181; 2004, 169–170. Here, Spinoza refers apparently to the so-called
Maimonidean controversy which began with the publication of the Guide in the twelfth century,
which Menachem Kellner describes as “an event of major social and political signiﬁcance, shaking the
Jewish communities of Spain, Provence, and even France for well over one hundred years.” See
Kellner’s account, which accords by in large with Spinoza’s description, in Kellner 1991, 79.
Spinoza devises a straightforward historical method for the interpretation of Scripture: “the universal
rule in interpreting Scripture is to attribute nothing to Scripture as its teaching [nihil Scripturae
tanquam eius documentum tribuere] which we have not understood as clearly as possible from its
history” (TTP 7, Spinoza 1925, III.99; 2004, 85).
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text even if it contradicts reason or seems absurd to philosophers. In addition,
the method must explain the most important passages and the central
teachings of Scripture, i.e. those that deal with salvation. As for the other,
more obscure passages, “there is no reason why we should be so worried
about the remaining things.”38 The Bible may contain irrational elements,
but the critical teachings for our salvation are clear. Spinoza adds in a telling
phrase that “in this perception” (in hac perceptione) the vulgar willingly
acquiesce. He means by this that the vulgar believe they can grasp, without
the help of interpreters, the critical teachings of Scripture on salvation.
But Spinoza’s critique of Maimonides is not conﬁned only to the problematic aspects of the Maimonidean hermeneutic. The failure to enlighten the
multitude betrays a deeper, more serious problem with the political analysis
that undergirds the project. Nor is this problem conﬁned to Maimonides.
Despite overwhelming evidence of the permanence of superstition in political
life, philosophers cling to the belief that the goal of politics should be to make
citizens rational or intellectually virtuous. They continue to imagine impossible political regimes, where reason rules and enlightens the multitude. This
belief that reason could somehow gain political authority has rendered political
philosophy ineﬀective and useless. Spinoza reports that philosophers
have never conceived a theory of politics which could be turned to use, but
such as might be taken for a chimera, or might have been formed in
Utopia . . . As in all sciences, which have a useful application, so especially
in that of politics, theory is supposed to be at variance with practice; and no
men are esteemed less ﬁt to direct public aﬀairs than theorists or
philosophers.39

In contrast to philosophers, statesmen have the practical task of directing
the passions, and this requires seeing political life more truly, that is,
without reference to reason. Such individuals – and here Spinoza seems to
have in mind Machiavelli – “have written about politics far more eﬀectively
than philosophers.”40 Rather than judge politics and condemn “cunning
38
40

TTP 7, Spinoza 1925, III.111; 2004, 96. 39 TP 1, Spinoza 1925, III.273; 2000, 33.
“[L]aw givers, with a view to exacting general obedience, have wisely set up another end, one very
diﬀerent from that which necessarily follows from the nature of the laws by promising to the
upholders of the laws what the vulgar love most, and on the other hand, by threatening those who
would violate them what the vulgar fear most” (TTP 4, Spinoza 1925, III.59; 2004, 44). Using hope
and fear, that is, by appealing to men’s strongest passions rather than their intellect, legislators have
“wisely” found a way to restrain the multitude and prescribe to them a manner of living. See also TTP
14, Spinoza 1925, III.178; 2004, 165 and Ethics Vp41s: “If men did not have this hope and fear, but
believed instead that minds die with the body, and that the wretched, exhausted with the burden of
morality, cannot look forward to a life to come, they would return to their natural disposition, and
would prefer to govern all their actions according to lust and to obey fortune rather than themselves.”
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and astute” statesman according to the standard of rationality, philosophers
must instead learn to appreciate how statesman use the passions to create a
stable unity or agreement among chronically superstitious citizens.41 The
proper task for philosophy is to learn and appreciate eﬀective practice from
non-rational statesmen.

Spinoza’s restatement of the political problem
If Spinoza rejects Maimonideanism in Chapter 7, why does he use theology
to support his own political agenda? Why does he portray Christianity as a
religion of liberation? In fact, a closer look at Spinoza’s theology shows that
he does not present the theology of freedom as identical to the teachings of
philosophy. As we shall see, his theology of freedom is no less superstitious
than the belief in the Mosaic law. The belief in freedom is not a substitute for
philosophy, nor does it contribute to the Enlightenment of the multitude.
Instead, his theology conscientiously beneﬁts the multitude by embracing
superstitions that contribute to the stability and security of society.
The starting point of Spinoza’s political thought is his famous doctrine of
the conatus, that all things in nature seek to maintain an equilibrium of their
parts and preserve their whole being.42 The human manifestation of conatus
is more complex because our perception of our being is partly conscious and
involves beliefs about the objects of our desires and fears. Indeed, the status
of these desires and fears is central to our perception of our conatus. Even
though such perceptions are very likely erroneous – particularly the belief
that I free to choose a strategy for preserving – nothing in nature has greater
authority or is more compelling to me than my own evaluation of my
conatus. Reason has little power over these evaluations. Spinoza does not
deny that philosophers can oﬀer better strategies for self-preservation, but
this is irrelevant to political life where “[e]ach deems that he alone knows
everything, and wants everything to be modiﬁed on the basis of his own
mental cast, and ﬁgures something is equitable or inequitable . . . insofar as
he judges it to fall to his proﬁt or harm”43
The primacy of the conatus and its tenuous relation to reason explains the
unwillingness of the multitude to defer to philosophers or, for that matter,
any authority. The suspicion of authority, even in the garb of reason and
41
43

TP VI, III, IV, Spinoza 1925, III.291, 287, 293; 2000, 64, 51, 58. 42 Ethics IIIp6–9, IVp22–26.
TTP 17, Spinoza 1925, III.203; 2004, 193. Also see TTP 16, Spinoza 1925, III.190; 2004, 180: “The
natural right of every man is thus determined, not by sound reason, but by desire and power.”
Spinoza’s account of human action is developed in E III, especially propositions 28–39. See also
Skulsky 2009, 121–129.
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philosophy, is reinforced by our experience and knowledge. Everyone –
including the self-proclaimed philosopher – is concerned ﬁrst and foremost
with his own preservation, and is willing to employ any means, including
deception, to secure it.44 The primacy of my pursuit of my own selfpreservation as I see ﬁt is the basis for the enduring belief in equality.
Were all men rational, the fact that there are better and worse strategies for
self-preservation would naturally translate into greater authority for the
wise. Unfortunately, reason is not equally distributed; to put it in
Spinoza’s memorable words, the sane have as much right as the insane.45
Without natural sanction, the wise have no authority to decide what is best
for others. This limitation forces us to lower the goal of politics, abandoning
moral or intellectual perfection which is at best available only to a few, in
favor of security and comfort, the beneﬁt of which all men recognize.
The Maimonidean dream of making men rational serves only to distract
us from the actual gulf between reason and passion which persists in political
life.46 This chasm becomes apparent when we perceive that the very terms
men commonly invoke in political life are imaginings, the result of inadequate ideas. By exposing this fact, and showing our moral vocabulary to be
illusory, reason corrodes the stability of actual regimes and contributes to
their political and intellectual chaos. The TTP presents the most politically
relevant examples of this chasm between inadequate and adequate ideas that
separate philosophers from the many. The concept of “law” as an adequate
idea, for instance, refers to those eﬀects “which follow necessarily from the
very nature or deﬁnition of a thing.”47 True laws are scientiﬁc descriptions of
the universal and determined causal relations which explain all of nature.
A philosopher perceives the “true object” of nature’s laws and therewith the
best manner of living. Such a rational being follows the law voluntarily since
he recognizes that its aim is none other than happiness.
But this concept of happiness is irrelevant politically because most people
“are completely ignorant of how things are really ordered and connected.”48
For the many, “it is better to consider things as open possibilities, and to
consider law as created by men.”49 This notion is based on a framework of
44

45

46
47
49

TP II, Spinoza 1925, III.280; 2000, 42. “The highest law of nature is that each thing endeavor, as
much as is in it, to persevere in its state – and do so without regard to anything but itself” (TTP 16,
Spinoza 1925, III.189; 2004, 179).
The recognition of inequality of wisdom, that others have better strategies for self-preservation, is the
starting point for education. The inability of most people to recognize this fact helps explain Spinoza’s
pessimism about educating the multitude.
TP II, IV, Spinoza 1925, III.282, 284, 292–294; 2000, 45,47, 58–60.
TTP 4, Spinoza 1925, III.57; 2004, 43. 48 TTP 4, Spinoza 1925, III.58; 2004, 44.
TTP 4, Spinoza 1925, III.58; 2004, 44.
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inadequate ideas, including will and freedom. When human beings issue
political laws, they presume the existence of an undetermined domain
within which our choices are meaningful. This domain applies only to
“the mind’s perception of things”; or more speciﬁcally, to our inadequate
ideas of our relation to other things. The realm of political authority
involves concepts such as justice, law, right, and freedom which are illusory
and impossible to harmonize with reason.50
The political problem, as Spinoza presents it, involves uniting nonrational citizens around a conceptual framework of justice, a concept
which is itself neither natural or rational.51 To achieve stability and peace
among self-seeking individuals involves directing passions and interests
so that people see the community as enhancing their interests or power.
This is not a matter of educating the citizens about the true deﬁnition of
justice or the greatest good or making the moral framework of political
life consistent with rationality.52 Such eﬀorts will not contribute to the
stability of the state; rather, the state must convince citizens that its power
contributes to their own pursuit of self-preservation.53 As Edwin Curley
observes, “the problem of forming a society with any chance of enduring
becomes the problem of designing a society whose members will continue
to perceive it to be useful to them.”54 The political problem can be
understood in terms of encouraging citizens to obey, by manipulating
their perception of the legitimacy and usefulness of the state. A careful
50

51
52

53

54

Douglas Den Uyl, responding to Smith’s claim that democracy fosters rationality, makes a similar
point: “Political action is never active in Spinoza’s sense, and the eﬀort to make it such carries with it
confusions that can translate into social conﬂict. Politics for Spinoza has a simple limited function
that in itself has nothing to do with perfection, activity, or blessedness . . . The best we could say is
that ‘democracy’ does not contradict the perfected active life – not that it fosters it. To foster it would
mean we would have some clear conception of how to bring activity about through political means”
(Den Uyl 1983, 12–13).
TP I, Spinoza 1925, III.282, 284; 2000, 45,47
The traditional judgments about politics are framed in morality categories such as justice or the good.
But such judgments are arbitrary and confuse our evaluation of politics. Moral claims merely “disguise
exhortation as description” and “indicate nothing positive in things, regarded in themselves” (Ethics IV,
Preface). Yet such illusions are critical to the perspective of superstitious citizens and therefore to the
legitimacy of the state (see TP I, II Spinoza 1925, III.274, 279; 2000, 35, 41; and Ep 22). Philosophers
must learn to respect the authority of these categories, even while recognizing that they are entirely
conventional.
As we have seen, Spinoza wishes to humble philosophers and force them to respect the wisdom of
non-philosophic statesmen. To this end, he urges philosophers to contemplate political life objectively as a scientist contemplates natural phenomenon, without imposing moral judgments (TP I,
Spinoza 1925, III.274; 2000, 35).
Curley 1991–1992, 41. See also Stanley Rosen: “The state exists as the result of a common agreement
by individuals to surrender their power to a sovereign authority for the sake of enhancing each man’s
power of self-preservation,” in Rosen 1987, 472.
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examination of Spinoza’s theology shows that it has been designed to do
just that.
Spinoza does not ignore the most common strategy employed by regimes
to “persuade” its citizens to obey the law, namely the use of force. But force
alone is not enough to ensure the perception of the legitimacy and usefulness of political power.55 Citizens still retain some measure of power or ius
even in the face of coercion. To achieve stability, therefore, a state must use
other strategies including an appeal to superstition.

Spinoza’s theology
Spinoza’s presentation of the political problem helps us understand the
critical role of superstition plays in his theological account. It also explains
why his theology contains an explicit attack on Scripture as a source of
knowledge about God. Spinoza does not hesitate to criticize Scripture as
corrupt throughout the TTP:
Those who consider the Bible, such as it is, as an Epistle of God sent to human
beings from heaven, will no doubt shout that I have committed a sin against
the Holy Spirit – by stating that God’s word is faulty, truncated, adulterated,
not consistent with itself, that we have only fragments of it, and ﬁnally, that the
transcript of God’s compact that he compacted with the Jews has perished.
But . . . God’s eternal word and compact, and true religion, are divinely
inscribed in the hearts of human beings, that is, in the human mind . . .56

The purpose of this critique is to limit the meaning of Scripture by exposing
it as a corrupt text written for a largely ignorant audience. Spinoza’s account
of Maimonides makes clear why he pursues such a damaging critique with
such energy. Maimonides had inadvertently expanded the possible meaning
of Scripture with terrible consequences; superstitious readers were heartened and persecuted their enemies, often violently. Spinoza’s portrait of
55

56

TTP 17, Spinoza 1925, III.201; 2004, 191. Power is the result of a dynamic relation between the pursuit
of one’s conatus and the perception of authority. This distinction, according to Steven Barbone and
Lee Rice, is presented in Spinoza’s work in terms of the contrast between potentia and potestas: “when
Spinoza uses the term potentia, he is almost always speaking of the ability or capacity to be able to do
something. This ability is an innate ability or operation of the individual who has it; that individual
exists and acts because of this power.” Potestas, on the other hand, is the authority or privilege which
permits us to do an action. Citizens always retain their potentia even when they transfer authority or
potestas to the state (Barbone and Rice 2000, 16–17). In Chapter 17 of the TTP, Spinoza links an
individual’s potentia to his essence. Den Uyl shows that Spinoza “conceives political society to be a
dynamic process of individual interactions” (Den Uyl 1983, 67). My account follows Den Uyl’s
explanation of collective power, especially the relation between political institutions and individual
conatus.
TTP 12, Spinoza 1925, III.158; 2004, 147.
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Scripture as a corrupt text prevents us from establishing even Scripture’s
literal meaning with certainty. This, in turn, forces theologians and religious
ﬁgures to turn their eﬀorts away from superstitious interpretation toward
unearthing the original meaning of the text which has been buried under
layers of historical and linguistic data. Though these eﬀorts are unlikely to
produce a single, dogmatic interpretation of such an ancient text, Spinoza
does not draw this conclusion.
He suggests instead that we can easily identify Scripture’s authoritative
moral teaching which promises salvation. Scripture’s essential teaching
concerns moral truths, which can be readily conﬁrmed by our hearts or
minds. The ambiguity between hearts and minds is revealing. Although at
times the TTP appears to suggest that Scripture’s teachings can be discovered or veriﬁed by reason, and further, that some prophets and apostles were
also philosophers, Spinoza does not build his case for their teachings on
their rationality. To the contrary, he provides ample evidence for doubting
the truth of revelation.57 His universal tenets of faith, for example, include
the belief in a deity who promises eternal rewards in exchange for obedience
to moral law, notions which are clearly inconsistent with his metaphysics.58
The teachings of Scripture are “eﬀective truths,” that is, they are superstitions that have a salutary eﬀect on their adherents. The truth of such
beliefs is irrelevant as long as they lead people to act in a kind and charitable
fashion.59 The moral truths in Scripture are in our hearts, that is, they have
nothing to do with metaphysics or knowledge:
[W]e conclude that the intellectual knowledge of God which considers his
nature just as it is in itself . . . does not pertain to faith and to revealed religion
57

58
59

Spinoza’s claim that the apostles were philosophers, who understood and taught philosophical truths
in a language that the multitude could grasp, is consistent with Maimonides, who repeatedly asserts
the hermeneutical principle that the “Torah was written in the language of the sons of man” (see, for
example, Guide I.26, 29, 33, 47, Maimonides 1963). By this, he means that in order to understand the
meaning of Scripture and the divine law, we must grasp how the law accommodates itself to frailties
and practices of the ancient Israelites. To take one example, the Torah’s obsession with laws of
sacriﬁce reﬂects the eﬀorts of Moses to wean the Israelites oﬀ of ancient, idolatrous practices by
redirecting their practices. See Klein-Braslavy 2006, 137–164.
See Smith 2003; Curley 1990.
Spinoza urges philosophers to accept the intellectual limitations of the multitude in a manner
consistent with Christian teachings. To this end, he reminds them of Paul’s teaching that “true
knowledge is not a command, but a divine gift, and that God asks of man no knowledge [of Himself]
other than knowledge of His divine justice and loving-kindness” (TTP 13, Spinoza 1925, III.169;
2004, 156). Spinoza urges men who have been blessed with such a gift not to insist on knowledge as
the sole criterion of piety because the “common people, the uneducated multitude” can aspire only to
imitate the truly pious by practicing caritas (TTP 13, Spinoza 1925, III.171; 2004, 159). This helps
explain why the particularities of various superstitions or religion are largely a matter of indiﬀerence to
Spinoza’s philosophers.
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in any mode; and, consequently, human beings can err about it astronomically without impropriety.60

The notion that one can separate moral from intellectual virtue, or that one
can adopt correct moral principles based on a false set of premises, is hardly
tenable for philosophers.61 But Spinoza does not insist that anyone should
be forced to accept the intellectual claims. He asks only that philosophers,
those who recognize the eﬀective truth of Scripture, adapt their views to the
language of Scripture.
Spinoza supplements his theological teachings with political superstitions. The theological teaching of the TTP (Chapters 1–15) prepares the
ground for his solution to the political problem (Chapters 16–20), where he
builds the case for liberal democracy as the regime which best preserves
natural right of equality and freedom. The belief in such rights stands in
sharp opposition to Spinoza’s metaphysics. The meaning of freedom, for
example, is highly suspect if every individual is fully determined by an
inﬁnite series of prior causes. Similarly, the belief in equality is also
questionable in light of Spinoza’s account on the ﬁxed, superstitious
disposition of the multitude. Still, such doubts do not mitigate the
eﬃcaciousness and widespread appeal of such beliefs. Indeed, given the
weakness of reason in political life, the belief in these political superstitions
represents the best practical solution to the political problem.62
Democracy oﬀers neither moral nor intellectual perfection to the
multitude, but this should not blind us to its other virtues. For one thing,
it is less harsh than the superstitious, and often violent, manipulation
commonly found in theocracies. Instead, it encourages an attitude of
toleration of diverse beliefs. Separating reason and revelation into exclusive
domains – “there is no connection or relationship between faith, or
Theology, and Philosophy” – means that religious beliefs and practices
are no longer judged by the standards of reason.63 Rather than entrust
philosophers with the religious or political authority to enlighten the multitude, Spinoza crafts a theology of religious freedom while circumscribing its
actual scope or domain of authority.64 From a Maimonidean point of view,
60
61
62
64

TTP 13, Spinoza 1925, III.171; 2004, 159.
Philosophers know that such morality is nothing more than the pursuit of self-interest as informed by
superstition: TTP 14, Spinoza 1925, III.179; 2004, 166.
See also Frankel, 2011, 55–76. 63 TTP 14 and Preface, Spinoza 1925, III.179, 10; 2004, 166, xxi.
From the TP II, Spinoza 1925, III.280; 2000, 42: “In my lexicon one is altogether ‘free’ only to the
extent that one is led by reason. To that extent one’s act are determined by causes that can be
adequately understood only by reference to one’s own nature, even as if causes they determine one’s
acts necessarily. Freedom . . . does not rule out necessity, freedom presupposes necessity.”
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perhaps, Spinoza’s toleration represents an attitude of indiﬀerence to the
intellectual welfare of the multitude. But Spinoza has already shown that
the intellectual perfection of the multitude is a self-defeating project;
indeed, caring for the multitude is possible only if philosophy abandons
the goal of making them rational. His liberal democracy oﬀers an
unprecedented level of security and comfort for mankind.

Conclusion: Spinoza’s enlightenment
We began our discussion with the disagreement among scholars on the
relation between Spinoza and Maimonides: some scholars emphasize
Spinoza’s kinship with Maimonides, while others focus on the comprehensiveness of his critique. We can now see that these positions reﬂect the
particular elements of Spinoza’s treatment of Maimonides in Chapters 5 and
7 of the TTP.
The ﬁrst attack in Chapter 5 is meant to appeal primarily to Spinoza’s
Christian audience by presenting the Gospels as more rational than the
Hebrew Bible in the sense that it promotes freedom. Despite this diﬀerence,
Spinoza’s overall project of using religion to direct superstitious individuals
to act in accordance with reason appears consistent with his account
of Maimonides. The diﬀerence between the two appears largely rhetorical
and theological, that is it reﬂects the diﬀerent audiences of the respective
works. In fact, Spinoza does not insist on the rationality of Scripture, but
only that its essential teaching is freedom from the law. By substituting
freedom – a superstition – for rationality, Spinoza radically departs from the
Maimonidean project. This diﬀerence becomes clear in his second attack on
Maimonides, as Chapter 7 exposes a more radical critique. What appears to
be a mere disagreement over hermeneutical issues reveals the dramatic
failure of the Maimonidean project to enlighten the multitude by making
politics and religion more consistent with reason.
In analyzing this failure, Spinoza alludes to the unbridgeable chasm
between philosophy and religion or politics. Men are directed by their
passions to pursue self-preservation without consulting reason. The absence
of reason in nature is apparent in politics as well. The conceptual world of
politics rests on a host of inadequate ideas, such as law and freedom. The
political ambitions of philosophers like Maimonides consistently fall short
because they ignore the limits of reason in political life. Spinoza rejects such
utopian projects and suggests instead a set of religious superstitions that
contribute to the stability of the regime. The most stable regime is liberal
democracy, which is rooted in the most natural and enduring superstitions,
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freedom and equality. The virtue of this regime is toleration which, from
the point of view of philosophy, represents a studied indiﬀerence to the
inadequacy of political superstitions.
The seeming contradiction between Spinoza’s critiques on Maimonides
dissolves therefore when we recognize that Spinoza’s political thought
eschews the goal of making the multitude rational in favor of the lower,
more practical goal of stability and security. This separation of reason from
politics allows Spinoza’s students to embrace superstitions which have a
salutary eﬀect on the multitude. As for theologians and philosophers,
Spinoza teaches them to tolerate various theologies as long as they culminate
in the practice of caritas. This political teaching represents nothing less than
the complete rejection of the Maimonidean project of enlightenment.

